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THE ROLE OF METALLURGY IN AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND LITIGATION
ALAN S. TETELMAN, Ph.D.*
HARRY S. REDMON, JR.**
When the Board of Editors invited Dr. Alan S. Tetelman and
Harry S. Redmon, Jr., Esq. to participate in the 1977 Air Law Sym-
posium, they were asked to use a question and answer format to
cover the topic of the role of metallurgy in aircraft accident in-
vestigation and litigation. Based on a given set of facts, Mr.
Redmon questioned Dr. Tetelman as though he were the defen-
dant's expert metallurgist on direct examination in an aircraft
accident case.
-The Board of Editors
For the purposes of our demonstration, please assume that a
light, single-engine aircraft crashed on landing. The pilot was a
high-time instructor and the passenger was a student. Ground
witnesses reported that when the aircraft was at about 800 feet
on final, it made an uncontrolled bank to the left and crashed.
Survivors of the passenger sued the aircraft manufacturer. The
plaintiff maintains that the strands of the flap cable activating the
left flap in the down position failed progressively in fatigue to the
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point where the cable's strength ultimately became so low that
it failed while the aircraft was on approach. Plaintiff claims that
this caused the left flap to retract, as a result of which the pilot
lost control. The defendant-manufacturer maintains that the ac-
cident resulted from pilot error or incapacitation and that the




HSR: Doctor, would you give us your name and address?
AST: Dr. Alan S. Tetelman, my address is 11777 Mississippi
Avenue, Los Angeles, California.
HSR: Please state your occupation and employer.
AST: Professor of Engineering, University of California at Los
Angeles, and Head of the Technical Staff at Failure Analy-
sis Associates.
HSR: What is the business of Failure Analysis Associates?
AST: Failure Analysis Associates is an engineering consulting
firm devoted to the analysis and prevention of mechanical
and structural failures. Approximately half of our work
METALLURGY
relates to the analysis of failures and the other half of our
work relates to preventing failures. We have an engineering
staff of approximately forty full-time personnel located
in Palo Alto, Los Angeles, and Houston.
HSR: Would you summarize your educational background and
any professional societies of which you are a member?
AST: Certainly. I received a Bachelors, Masters, and Doctorate
of Engineering degrees from Yale University and I am a
past member of the National Materials Advisory Board,
an advisor of the National Science Foundation and Nation-
al Commission on Consumer Product Safety. I have re-
ceived several awards such as the Engineering Merit Award
of the Engineering Foundation and was Distinguished lec-
turer for the American Society of Metals.
HSR: Are you the author of any books or publications in the
field of metallurgy?
AST: Yes. I have authored two books and ninety technical pub-
lications dealing with the areas of fatigue and brittle frac-
ture, stress corrosion cracking, and risk and reliability.
HSR: Are you a registered professional engineer?
AST: Yes.
HSR: Doctor, just what is involved in the field of metallurgy?
AST: Metallurgy is a field that is related to the study of the prop-
erties of materials and how those properties such as strength
and hardness can be changed by changing the composition
of the metal, changing its heat treatment and its micro-
structure.
HSR: Doctor, a number of experts will testify in this case includ-
ing metallurgists, mechanical engineers, aerodynamicists,
and aeronautical engineers and meteorologists. Would you
explain for us how these fields interrelate in an aircraft
crash investigation?
AST: Certainly. If we're talking about the possibility of in-flight
break up, the meteorologist would testify as to what type
of winds were present. The aerodynamicist would talk about
how winds would produce various loads on portions of the
wing. The aeronautical structural engineer would talk about
how those loads would produce stresses in various structural
19781
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members such as sparcaps and skin and the metallurgist
and the structural engineer together would determine wheth-
er or not those stresses exceeded the design allowables for
the wing. The metallurgist would also determine whether
there were any defects in the material and whether the
material's strength meets its specifications.
HSR: Have you previously qualified as an expert witness in metal-
lurgy'?
AST: Yes, I have.
HSR: Does your work include investigations into failures of metals
in both aircraft and non-aircraft cases?
AST: Yes, it does. From a metallurgical point of view it doesn't
matter whether the metal is in an aircraft or whether it's
in a pipeline or whether it is in a heart valve. A metallurgist
approaches the problems the same way and in trying to
solve them uses a certain set of logical principles and ex-
perimental tools.
HSR: Doctor, as you know from previous testimony, the plaintiff
in this case maintains that plaintiff's Exhibit 1, which is
the flap cable activating the left flap in the down position,
failed progressively in fatigue with the result that its strength
was so low that the cable eventually failed as the aircraft
was approaching for landing. Now Doctor, I am going to
show you plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and I ask you whether or
not at my request you undertook to determine the cause
of the failure of that exhibit.
AST: Yes, I did.
HSR: What approach did you use in this analysis?
AST: The approach that I used in this analysis as to the cause
of failure is shown in Exhibit 2. Basically, an analysis
into the cause of failure of a critical component involves
four parts. In conjunction with the physical examina-
tion, exemplar tests are often conducted to compare the
alleged mode of failure with known modes of failure.
First, there is a physical exam to determine the mode of
failure. Second, there is a mechanical stress-strength an-
alysis to determine whether the stresses on the part were
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factor was responsible for the failure. Third is an analysis
of the way in which any incipient failure might have been
detected prior to the accident. A probabilistic analysis is
done to examine the past history of the component and
determine if there was a likelihood that it could fail in this
case, based on previous history. Finally, having determined
something about the cause of the failure, a human factor
analysis is conducted, in which I have no direct role, to
determine which human being in the sequence of events
may have contributed to the cause of the failure. Now all
of these things begin to take place after a field examination
of the parts which occurs on the accident site, and a review
of pertinent documents.
Fatigue takes place over a period of time as compared to
overload fracture which occurs instantaneously when the
stresses on the component exceed its strength. Fatigue is
a progressive form of damage, rather like cancer in a person,
and an overload fracture is like a heart attack.
HSR: Now Doctor, before we move on to your physical examina-
tion of plaintiff's Exhibit 1, let me ask whether you re-
viewed any documents or other materials in preparation for
that analysis.
AST: Yes, I did.
HSR: Did you have available manufacturer's and aircraft com-
ponent's specifications, blueprints, test data, or product
safety studies?
AST: Yes, I did.
HSR: What about FAA General Aviation Airworthiness' Alerts1
and Service Difficulty Reports?2
General Aviation Airworthiness Alerts are available from the FAA by
writing:
FAA General Aviation Airworthiness Branch
AFS-830
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591
Telephone (202) 426-8203




Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73125
Telephone: (405) 686-4171
METALLURGY
AST: I checked those out. There were no General Aviation Air-
worthiness Alert or Service Difficulty Reports on this par-
ticular subject.
HSR: Did you check for Airworthiness Directives,3 service bul-
letins,' or service letters?5
AST: Yes, I did.
HSR: How about aircraft maintenance and overhaul records and
logs and flight manuals?
AST: Yes, I did review those.
HSR: Did you have the NTSB report with exhibits and any photo-
graphs that might have been available?
AST: Yes, I did at the time I began my examination.
HSR: Did you review the plaintiff's metallurgical reports?
AST: Yes, I did.
HSR: As I mentioned to you earlier, this case turns on whether
plaintiff's Exhibit 1 failed in fatigue or overload. Would you
explain for us just what a fatigue failure is as opposed to
an overload failure?
AST: Certainly. A fatigue failure involves the initiation and pro-
gressive growth of a crack over a period of time. Generally,
fatigue occurs in components that are subject to reversed or
alternating loading, that is a load that is put on and then
taken off or put on in tension and then reversed into com-
pression.
HSR: Turning again to plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Doctor, did you ana-
lyze the fracture surface to determine the mode of failure?
AST: Yes, I did.
HSR: Would you please now proceed to describe the steps in
your study of the fracture surface in your efforts to deter-
mine the mode of failure?
'Airworthiness directives are issued by the FAA pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
1421, 1423 (1976) and 14 C.F.R. § 39 (1978). They are published weekly in the
Federal Register.
'Service bulletins are published and available through the manufacturer of
an aircraft or a component part of the aircraft.
'Service letters are published, and available through the manufacturer of an
aircraft or a component part of the aircraft.
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1. Physical Evidence Level of Observation
a. Actual Failure Macro/Micro/SEM
b. Parallel Failure in
Same Accident
c. Textbook Failure
d. Exemplar Failure in
Laboratory Field Test






AST: Certainly. Exhibit 3 illustrates the type of physical exam-
ination that is conducted to see what the metal has to say
for itself about the way it failed. There are two parts to the
physical exam. First, there's the examination of the physical
evidence itself; this involves an examination of the actual
failure surfaces and a comparison of the failure surface
with other types of failure such as: 1) with a failure that
has occurred in the same accident in a similar component
where the failure mode is known; 2) with a textbook type
of failure such as fatigue, brittle fracture of ductile frac-
ture; and 3) in some cases, if there is no textbook failure
available, it's necessary to produce your own textbook
failure by going into the laboratory and producing a fatigue
failure or an overload failure and having that for compari-
son with the one that failed in the accident. The subject
failure and the exemplar failure can be compared at dif-
ferent levels of observation. You can do it microscopically
with an optical microscope (60X - 1000X) or increasingly
today with the scanning electron microscope which allows
you to do it at high magnifications (10OX - 5000X). The
first part of the physical exam, then, involves determining
what type of failure mode has taken place.
METALLURGY
The second part involves determining whether the mater-
ial in question meets the specified alloy chemistry, hardness,
the microstructure, and the dimensions that were called for
on the blueprint. In some cases, particularly where a failure
has occurred near a weld, it's important to determine wheth-
er any repairs have been made, usually by determining the
different chemistries of weld overlays.
HSR: Would you now review for us your physical examination
of plaintiff's Exhibit 1?
AST: Certainly. The allegation has been made in this case that
the failure has occurred progressively because of the un-
ravelling of the cable. Now, there was also a second control
cable that was located adjacent to the one that is the subject
of this lawsuit. The second failure had taken place by over-
load. That failure occurred in the E cable. Exhibit 4 shows
that irt overload fracture unravelling of the strands has
also taken place. This tells us that the presence of unravel-
ling does not prove the presence of progressive fracture,
since we have unravelling in a cable that has failed by
overload.
EXHIBIT 4
Exhibit 5 shows a scanning electron micrograph of the
fracture of the subject cable itself, one of the strands of
the cable that is alleged to have failed by fatigue. And
1978]
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EXHIBIT 5
the important features here are the fact that the cable
has necked down, you can see it drawing down to a chisel
point, and also the fact that there are dimples on the frac-
ture surface and the fracture surface is slanted and does not
contain any flat fracture.
Exhibit 6 shows a fracture surface of a cable strand
from the overload fracture which also shows the presence
of necking down and dimples and this strand looks like
one of the strands in alleged fatigue failure. Consequently,
this tells us that the fracture appearance of the subject cable
is similar to that of an overload fracture. Now in doing
this type of work it's desirable not only to show what has
occurred but what has not occurred. Exhibit 7 is the text-
book failure of fatigue in a strand, showing that when we
get fatigue of wire, there is generally a very flat structure
followed by some longitudinal splitting or tearing fracture.
This was not observed in the subject cable.
METALLURGY
EXHIBIT 6
Exhibit 8 is a slide showing an electron micrograph
of a fatigue failure in stainless steel indicating that when
fatigue occurs one generally sees the presence of striations
which are the little parallel lines on the photograph. These
also were not found on the subject cable.
Therefore, based upon the macroscopic and the micro-
scopic examination in the scanning electron microscope
exam we conclude that the subject cable failed by overload
rather than by fatigue since it has all the appearances of
overload and none of the appearance of fatigue.
HSR: Doctor, did you conduct a microprobe examination?
AST: No, we did not. The microprobe examination is conducted
to determine the presence of any foreign elements on a
fracture surface-paint smears or foreign species. There
were none-that was not an issue in this case and hence
the microprobe exam was not conducted.
HSR: Now Doctor, having concluded from your examination of
1978]
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(a) Section of the wire rope adjacent to the
fracture, at about 11AX. (b) Micrograph, at
about 75X, of an unetched longitudinal section
of a wire from the rope, showing fatigue cracks
originating from both sides.
Fig. 5. Steel wire rope, used on a clean-
ing-line crane, that failed from fatigue
resulting from vibration caused by shock
loading (Example 3)
EXHIBIT 7
Reprinted with the permission of the American Society of Metals from 10 METALS
HANDBOOK 462, fig. 5 (8th ed. 1975).
the physical evidence that plaintiff's Exhibit 1 failed in
overload, did you run a specifications and property check?
AST: Yes, I did.
HSR: Just what exactly is a specifications and property check
and why was it run in this case?
AST: As I indicated earlier, a specifications and property check
involves a determination of whether the material was of
the correct chemistry called for on the drawings. In some
j
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TEM fractograph (p-c replica) 40,000X
3885 Surface of a fatigue crack in type301 stainless steel, produced at a
stress-intensity range (AK) at the crack tip
of 37.9 MParn (34.5 ksi-in.') at 95 C (203
F). Spacing of clearly detinCd fatigue stria-
tions is about 0.04 jaml. See also 3886.
EXHIBIT 8
Reprinted with the permission of the American Society of Metals from 9 METALS
HANDBOOK 223, fig. 3885 (8th ed. 1974).
cases, the chemical analysis might determine if a part was
part of an original manufacturer's production run based
upon the material he used at the time, was an accounted
for replacement part, or was a bogus part. The most appro-
priate test in this case was a dimensional check to determine
whether the cable strands were the right diameter and a
hardness test to determine whether each strand had the
appropriate hardness, since the overall cable strength is
determined by the cable size and the cable hardness. Both
of those checks were run.
HSR: Did plaintiff's Exhibit 1 meet the required specifications?
AST: Yes. it did.
19781
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HSR: Having found that plaintiff's Exhibit 1 met the specifica-
cations, does that help you determine whether or not it
failed under normal loads?
AST: Yes, it does.
HSR: In what way?
Failure
Asoates,_ _





















AST: The approach that we used is best illustrated by Exhibit
9 which describes the conditions for failure and the con-
ditions for no failure. A properly designed part is one
where the stresses acting on the component are below the
strength of the component. As shown on the top example
of Exhibit 9, we have no failure when the stress is less than
the strength and in this particular case the loads acting on
the cable were thirty to 130 pounds maximum during flight.
METALLURGY
The cable itself is designed to handle a load of 920 pounds;
we know that because we know the cross-sectional area of
each strand and we know the number of strands and we
know the tensile strength of each strand. If you determine
tensile strength and multiply the strength by the area you
get the load carrying capacity, which is 920 pounds. This
cable, then, is one where there is a very large factor of
safety, where the maximum stress the cable is supposed to
bear is far below its strength.
HSR: Now Doctor, I'd like for you to assume, as the plaintiff
maintains, that seventy-five percent of the strands of plain-
tiff's Exhibit 1 had failed progressively before the crash.
Assuming that to be true, could that have any effect on the
operational integrity of plaintiff's Exhibit 1?
AST: No, I don't believe it could because even if we have three-
quarters of that cable gone the residual strength would
still be 230 pounds. Since the maximum load on the cable
is 130 pounds, that failure would not have taken place.
HSR: Did the result of the stress/strength analysis affect in any
way your earlier stated opinion that plaintiff's Exhibit 1
failed in overload?
AST: Not at all. The failure occurred in overload and I believe
that the failure occurred during ground impact when the
wing moved away from the fuselage. The cables were
stretched and at least 920 pounds of load was applied to
the cable, as shown in the third example, and the applied
stresses reached the strength of the cable.
HSR: Did you consider any other factors in your analysis?
AST: Yes, I did.
HSR: What factors were those?
AST: I considered the fact that this failure occurred at 3,020-
hours of operation, and at 3,000 hours two inspectors had
checked off on the log book that they had run towels
across the cables and found no broken strands. We know
that in any form of progressive failure that the failure takes
place over a period of time. If the plaintiff's theory were
correct there would have been some strands broken at the
3,000 hour mark. According to plaintiff's theory, the cable
1978]
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would have had full strength at 3,000 hours but by 3,020
hours the strength would have dropped down to 130 pounds.
That is so improbable that I would consider this an unlikely
event.
HSR: Now Doctor, considering your analysis in its entirety would
you give us your opinion relative to the cause of the failure
of plaintiff's Exhibit 1?
AST: Well, in summary, I believe that plaintiff's Exhibit 1 failed
during ground impact when the wing separated from the
fuselage and the cable was overloaded and the unraveling
of the cable was simply a consequence of the release of any
stored energy in the strands that had been put in during
the manufacturing process.
HSR: Thank you, Doctor; your witness, counsel.
